Personal Email Networks: An Effective Anti-Spam Tool by Boykin, P. Oscar & Roychowdhury, Vwani
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
40
21
43
v1
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
dis
-n
n]
  4
 Fe
b 2
00
4
Personal Email Networks: An Effective Anti-Spam Tool
P. Oscar Boykin and Vwani Roychowdhury∗
Department of Electrical Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095
(Dated: February 3, 2004)
We provide an automated graph theoretic method for identifying individual users’ trusted net-
works of friends in cyberspace. We routinely use our social networks to judge the trustworthiness of
outsiders, i.e., to decide where to buy our next car, or to find a good mechanic for it. In this work,
we show that an email user may similarly use his email network, constructed solely from sender and
recipient information available in the email headers, to distinguish between unsolicited commercial
emails, commonly called “spam”, and emails associated with his circles of friends. We exploit the
properties of social networks to construct an automated anti-spam tool which processes an individual
user’s personal email network to simultaneously identify the user’s core trusted networks of friends,
as well as subnetworks generated by spams. In our empirical studies of individual mail boxes, our
algorithm classified approximately 53% of all emails as spam or non-spam, with 100% accuracy.
Some of the emails are left unclassified by this network analysis tool. However, one can exploit
two of the following useful features. First, it requires no user intervention or supervised training;
second, it results in no false negatives i.e., spam being misclassified as non-spam, or vice versa. We
demonstrate that these two features suggest that our algorithm may be used as a platform for a
comprehensive solution to the spam problem when used in concert with more sophisticated, but
more cumbersome, content-based filters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The amount of unsolicited commercial email (spam),
and more importantly, the fraction of email which is
spam, has risen dramatically in the last few years. Re-
cently, a study has shown that 52% of email users say
spam has made them less trusting of email, and 25%
say that the volume of spam has reduced their usage of
email[3]. This crisis has prompted proposals for a broad
spectrum of potential solutions, ranging from the design
of more efficient anti-spam software tools to calls for anti-
spam laws at both the federal and state levels. While the
jury is still out on how widely such anti-spam laws will be
enacted and how effective they would be in stemming the
flow, the objective of the various legal and technical solu-
tions are the same: to make it unprofitable to send spam
and thereby destroy the spammers’ underlying business
model.
Any measure that stops spam from reaching users’ in-
boxes with probability p and is deployed by users with
probability q increases the average cost of sending spam
by 1/(1− pq). For instance, if a filter has 90% accuracy
and is used by 90% of users, the the cost of sending spam
will increase by more than 500%. However, even if a fil-
ter is 99.9% accurate, but only 1% of users actually use
it, then spammers’ costs will only increase by 1%. Thus,
the need is for anti-spam techniques that work accurately
enough and, more importantly, are user friendly and com-
putationally efficient so that they can be widely deployed
and used. In evaluating the accuracy of the anti-spam
tool, it is especially important that the algorithm should
generate virtually no false negatives, since each non-spam
∗Electronic address: boykin,vwani@ee.ucla.edu.
message that gets thrown in the spam folder undermines
the confidence of the user, and decreases the likelihood
that anti-spam filters will be used universally. In evalu-
ating the ease of use of the anti-spam tool, there should
be a strong preference for automated algorithms, which
require little or no direct input from individual users.
We report a surprisingly effective technique that can
simultaneously achieve the two above-mentioned require-
ments of accuracy and automation. This technique is
predicated upon the unique characteristics inherent to so-
cial networks and the proven wisdom of using such trust
networks to make the right choices. Almost all our con-
tractual decisions (e.g., from the schools we choose for
our kids, to the people we trust with our money) de-
pend heavily on information provided by our networks of
friends. The reliability of the decisions we make, then,
depends strongly on the trustworthiness of our underly-
ing social networks. Thus, we seem to have evolution-
arily developed a number of interaction strategies that
can generate a trustworthy network, and a commonly es-
poused rule suggests that trust is to be built based not
only on how well you know a person, but also on how
well that person is known to the other people in your
network. This interaction dynamic results in “close-knit”
communities; that is, communities where, if Alice knows
Bob and Charlotte, then it is highly likely that Bob and
Charlotte also know each other. In this paper, we show
that this natural instinct to form close-knit social net-
works is operative in the cyberspace as well, and can be
exploited to provide an effective and automated spam
filtering algorithm.
First, we show that if one constructs personal email
networks, then one can identify distinct close-knit or clus-
tered subnetworks of email-addresses that communicate
with each other via the user, and that the emails origi-
nating from such addresses are trustworthy or non-spam.
2In Sections II - III, we discuss the construction of per-
sonal email networks and the structure of social subnet-
works. In Section IV, we show that there also exist large
connected subnetworks of email addresses that are not
close-knit, and that the emails related to these addresses
are overwhelmingly spams. In Section V, we show that
our algorithm, when used alone, can classify more than
half of all email messages in an individual user’s inbox,
without any mistakes. Further analysis shows that we ac-
curately classified approximately 44% of all the non-spam
emails, and 54% of all spam emails, while 47% of all email
is not classified, because they are related to subnetworks
that are too small in size to allow reliable determination
of statistics. Thus, the automated network-only-based
algorithm does not make any mistakes, but leaves a sub-
set of the messages unclassified; clearly, one needs to use
more sophisticated content-based filters to classify these.
However, these complex filters achieve their advertised
high accuracies only when trained with a sufficient num-
ber of messages received by individual users. This in
turn necessitates manual and intentional user interven-
tion, a potential bottleneck to a widespread deployment
of accurate filters. Since the proposed network-based al-
gorithm automatically generates large samples of both
non-spam and spam messages, it can considerably allevi-
ate the training problem. Section VI is devoted to show-
ing how the personal email networks provide a platform
for a comprehensive solution to the spam problem, by
combining the flexibility of sophisticated, content-based
filters with the ease of use of an automated filter.
II. PERSONAL EMAIL NETWORKS
In previous works, email graphs have been constructed
based on email address books[6] or complete email logs
of sets of users [1, 2, 9]. In this work, we build our net-
work based on the information available to only one user
of an email system, specifically, the headers of all the
email messages in that user’s inbox. Each email header
contains the email address of one sender, stored in the
“From:” field, and a list of recipient addresses, stored in
the “To:” and “Cc:” fields. We construct a personal email
network by first creating nodes representing all the ad-
dresses that appear in all the email headers in the user’s
inbox. Edges are added between pairs of addresses that
appear in the same header, i.e. that have communicated
via the user. For example, suppose Bob sends a message
“To:” Alice and Charlotte, with a “Cc:” to David and
Eve, then we can represent this email interaction via a
star subnetwork, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Finally, all nodes representing the user’s own email ad-
dresses are removed, since we are interested only in the
connections among email addresses who communicate via
the user. Fig.2 shows a personal email network for one
of the authors of the paper. Interestingly, and perhaps
contrary to intuition, the largest connected component
in this particular network corresponds to spam-related
A
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FIG. 1: The subgraph resulting from an example message
from A, to B,C and cc to D,E.
emails. This raises the question: how does one determine
which subnetworks correspond to trusted email addresses
and which ones correspond to spam-related ones?
III. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND WHITELISTS
A number of recent studies have identified quantita-
tive measures of the closeness of a community, and have
shown that, indeed, these measures can be used to dis-
tinguish empirically observed social networks from more
anonymous and non-social networks [2, 4, 8]. The most
distinctive property of social networks is their tendency
to cluster. For example, if Alice knows Bob and Eve,
i.e., Bob and Eve are connected through Alice, then, in
a social network, the likelihood of Bob knowing Eve is
considerably higher than in, for example, a random net-
work with very similar degree distribution. A qualitative
expression for the clustering coefficient of a network is de-
fined as follows: we count all pairs of nodes that are part
of a wedge, i.e., each node in the pair has a direct edge to
a third node. According to the intuitive notion of clus-
tering mentioned above, we expect that in a graph with
high clustering coefficient, many of these pairs will also
be connected via an edge, i.e., many of the wedges also
form triangles. Hence, the clustering coefficient (some-
times called transitivity), C, of a graph can be expressed
as:
C =
3× (number of triangles in the graph)
number of wedges
(1)
This expression gives the reader a feel for the physical
meaning of the clustering coefficient in social networks.
The quantitative definition of the clustering coefficient
that we will use for the rest of this work involves counting
the fraction of neighbors of a node which are also neigh-
bors to each other. Specifically, if a node has degree ki,
then it has ki neighbors. Each of those ki neighbors po-
tentially are connected to each other. There are a total of
ki(ki − 1)/2 possible connections between the neighbors.
By counting the number of connections that exist, Ei,
and dividing by ki(ki − 1)/2, we get the clustering coef-
ficient for the node. If a node has degree 1, this quantity
3FIG. 2: One author’s complete email network, formed by 5,486 messages. The largest component (component 1, at center)
is enlarged to show structure. The second largest, component 2, is boxed at upper left. An enlarged view of component 2 is
shown in Fig. 3
FIG. 3: The second largest component (called component 2)
in one author’s email graph for a six week period
FIG. 4: A subgraph of a spam component. See two spammers
and their many recipients. These two spammers share many
co-recipients, as seen in the middle of the graph. In this
subgraph, no node shares a neighbor with any of its neighbors.
FIG. 5: A subgraph of a non-spam component. Note the high
incidence of triangle structures, as compared with the spam
subgraph shown in Fig. 4
4is undefined, thus we only count nodes of degree greater
than 1. The clustering coefficient for the entire graph is
the average of the clustering coefficient for each node (of
degree greater than 1):
C =
1
N2
∑
i
2Ei
ki(ki − 1)
(2)
where N2 is the total number of nodes in the network
with degree 2 or greater. This metric has been applied
to email graphs previously and has been found to be more
than 10 times larger than one would expect from a ran-
dom graph with the same degree distribution[2].
As an example of how clustering coefficient may be
used to distinguish between spam and non-spam emails,
consider the connected components 1 and 2, shown in
Fig. 2 and 3, respectively. Some properties of these and
other components are listed in Table I. Component num-
ber 1 has a clustering coefficient of 0: exactly zero nodes
share neighbors with any of their neighbors. On the other
hand, component 2, which is smaller in size, has a clus-
tering coefficient of 0.67, or, on average, 67% of each
node’s neighbors are connected to each other. Figures 4
and 5 show subgraphs from components 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The relative incidence of the triangle structures
that characterize close-knit communities can be clearly
seen in these subgraphs. Recognizing that social net-
works have high clustering coefficients, we can be confi-
dent that the email addresses in component 2 are a part
of the user’s social network in the cyberspace. Thus, any
email with one of the nodes from the second component
in the header can be classified as a non-spam. The email
addresses associated with these nodes comprise the user’s
whitelist.
Component N C kmax
kmax+1
N
1 3560 0 542 0.153
2 266 0.673 112 0.425
3 174 0 98 0.569
4 49 0 48 1
5 34 0 17 0.529
6 22 0 21 1
TABLE I: Statistics on largest components of complete email
network shown in Fig. 2.
IV. BLACKLISTS AND THE FORMATION OF
SPAM COMPONENTS
Can we also conclude that the first component, which
has a very low clustering coefficient, is generated by
spams? If so, then any email for which a node inside
the first component is a sender or co-recipient can be la-
beled as spam. Indeed, a detailed bookkeeping of the
inbox shows that the email addresses in component 1 are
always related to spams, just as those in component 2 are
always part of the user’s social network! In other words,
the email addresses in the first component can comprise
a blacklist.
We have already discussed the reasons why we should
expect our networks of friends to have a high cluster-
ing coefficient, but we have yet to understand why a
large subnetwork with low clustering coefficient should
necessarily be spam-induced. A careful analysis of com-
ponent 1 reveals that it has been created by a com-
mon form of spamming technique called the dictionary
attack, where spammers send messages to co-recipients
sorted according to email address. For example, if one
has an email address “adam@mail.com”, one will tend
to see co-recipients with alphabetically similar email ad-
dresses, such as “arthur@mail.com”, “alex@mail.com”,
“avid@mail.com”, etc. Due to sorted recipient lists, it
is not at all uncommon to have co-recipients repeated in
different spam email messages, causing the disconnected
spam components to merge into larger and larger com-
ponents. One can view the spam messages as forming
a bi-partite graph, with two types of nodes represent-
ing spammers and spam recipients. Since the spammers
don’t spam one another, and the co-recipients of spam
messages don’t know one another, this graph will always
have a clustering coefficient of 0.
An obvious question is: how quickly do we expect the
spammer components to merge? To answer this, we need
to examine the probability that two different spammers
send messages to the same co-recipient. In figure 6, we
see the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of the number of co-recipients per spam mes-
sage. In this data, the average number of recipients of
a spam message is 3.87. As a model, we assume that
each spammer uses a “From:” address only one time, and
sends the spam to l recipients chosen at random. Based
on our data, we choose l ≈ 3.87. The model assumes that
there are k email addresses near to the user’s address in
the sorted address space.
We can solve for the size of the largest connected
component in the following way. Define Si to be the
size of the largest connected component after i mes-
sages. The probability that each recipient is already
in the largest component is Si/k = q. The probabil-
ity that m of the recipients are in the largest component
is pm =
(
l
l−m
)
(1 − q)l−mqm. Putting this together in a
rate equation, we find:
Si+1 =
l∑
m=0
pm(Si + (l −m))− p0l
= Si + (1− p0)l − ql
= Si −
l
k
Si + (1− (1− q)
l)l
dSi
di
≈ (1− (1 − q)l)l −
l
k
Si
We can approximate the above in two regimes, namely,
unsaturated (q ≪ 1) and saturated (q ≈ 1) to get two
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FIG. 6: CCDF of the number of co-recipients per message for
spam and non-spam messages. The x-axis shows the number
of co-recipients, and the y-axis is the number of messages with
at least that number of co-recipients. The mean number of
co-recipients for the spam messages is 3.87; for non-spam, it
is 1.71.
different solutions. In the unsaturated regime,
dSi
di
≈ (1− (1− q)l)l −
l
k
Si
≈ l2q −
l
k
Si
=
l(l− 1)
k
Si
=⇒ Si = le
l(l−1)
k
i
In the saturated regime,
dSi
di
≈ (1− (1− q)l)l −
l
k
Si
≈ l−
l
k
Si
=⇒ Si = k(1− e
−
l
k
i) + le−
l
k
i
Clearly, after O(k/l2) messages, the spam components
should start to join. This analysis underestimates the
joining rate because it always assumes that a message
only joins with the largest component, and never adds
more than one component together, which clearly only
increases the rate that the spam components grow in size.
Additionally, we have ignored the fact that the nearer the
address by alphabetical measure, the more likely they are
to be co-recipients of an email message. Instead we have
approximated that there are k nearby addresses, and they
are all selected at random.
Spammers, of course, will try to defeat any and all
anti-spam tools. There are a few countermeasures that
spammers could take to attempt to foil the proposed al-
gorithm. The most obvious countermeasure is to never
use multiple recipients in the To: or Cc: headers of a
spam message. In that way, spam components would be
isolated nodes in our graph, and would be disregarded for
the purposes of constructing the blacklist. However, this
would not impact the ability of users to automatically
generate whitelists, which are extremely valuable in im-
proving the accuracy of content-based filtering systems.
The spammer could also attempt to make the algorithm
misclassify them as a non-spammer. For instance, spam-
mers could try to learn email addresses for friends of
each user by means of email viruses, proximity of email
addresses on web pages, or other means. The spammer
could then include the user’s friends as co-recipients of
a spam message, thus posing as a member of the user’s
social network. However, if spammers can impersonate
members of your whitelist they can damage the effective-
ness of any whitelisting scheme, not just our algorithm.
V. GREYLISTS: THE ALGORITHM AND ITS
EFFICACY
We have described an algorithm that divides a single
user’s personal email network into disconnected compo-
nents and attempts to identify each component as spam
or non-spam based only on the value of the clustering
coefficient. We’ve discussed this metric for two large
subnetworks of one author’s email graph, but now we
must ask: is it possible to classify all components us-
ing this scheme? For each component, we note the size,
the maximum degree kmax, and the clustering coefficient.
We expect that there is a minimum number of nodes for
which the clustering coefficient of a component can be
reliably measured. Components smaller than this cutoff
size, Smin, then, must be excluded from our classifica-
tion scheme. We also know that, for power-law graphs
with exponents greater than or equal to −2.0, we can
expect the maximum degree to be on order of the size of
the graph[8]. Previous works [1, 2], as well as this one
(see Fig. 7), find degree distributions with exponents
greater than −2.0. We use this fact to introduce another
cut-off parameter. All components with clustering coeffi-
cient equal to 0 and (kmax +1)/size greater than Kfrac,
are also disregarded, in order to limit the impact a single
node can have on the statistics. Remaining components
with clustering coefficient less than some critical value,
Cmin, are assumed to be spam components, and all nodes
in these components are written to the blacklist. If a com-
ponent has clustering coefficient greater than Cmax, then
we write all nodes to the whitelist. The rare case in which
a component which was not disregarded has a clustering
coefficient between Cmin and Cmax is addressed later in
this section.
The criteria for choosing the cutoff parameters Smin,
Kfrac, Cmin, and Cmax are as follows:
• Choice of Smin and Kfrac: Single messages can
make isolated components which it is not clear how
to classify a priori, since every message with k co-
recipients can create a component with clustering
coefficient equal to 0.0 and size k. Setting Kfrac
less than 1.0 (0.6 − 0.8 works well in practice) en-
sures that a component from a single message will
6not be considered. A more direct route (but one
that can’t be realized using purely graph theoretic
methods) is to only consider components formed by
N or more messages. The size cutoff should come
from the number of recipients a message is expected
to have. Setting this far above the mean also in-
sures that several messages are required for each
component. For the data we examined, a cutoff
size of 10− 20 seemed to work well.
• Choice of Cmin and Cmax: As we saw in section IV,
we expect spam components to have C = 0. On the
other hand, in our data, as in previous studies[2,
8], the clustering coefficient of the social graphs is
found to be an order of magnitude larger than one
would expect for a random graph with the same
degree distribution. In this work, Cmin = 0.01,
and Cmax = 0.1 produce excellent results.
The methods for choosing the various parameters could
be improved with further research on more personal email
networks to better understand the statistical properties
of these networks over a larger set of users.
We have already discussed how email addresses associ-
ated with components larger than Smin and with cluster-
ing coefficients less than Cmin or greater than Cmax are
sorted into whitelists and blacklists. We now resolve how
to deal with large components that have an intermediate
value of the clustering coefficient.
In general, we assume that spammers don’t know who
the user’s friends are, so it is very unlikely for a spam-
mer to email the user and a friend of the user in the
same message. This presumably[11] happens purely by
chance, and is also presumably very rare, since we can
imagine that each co-recipient on a spam message is a
friend with some very small probability. Hence, spam
components usually stay disconnected from friend com-
ponents. There is always the possibility, however, that a
spam message will have a co-recipient in common with
a non-spam message. The cross-component connections
are most likely to happen in spam components with a
large number of co-recipients; this means that chance
connections will result in a non-spam component joined
with a large spam component via a small number of edges
(the chance co-recipient connections). From a graph the-
oretic perspective, this situation will correspond to two
connected “communities” which have very few edges be-
tween them, and which also have very different cluster-
ing coefficients. We may identify these cases when we
find large components with intermediate clustering co-
efficients. For instance, if the component size is large,
but the clustering coefficient is less than Cmax, we may
assume that it is a joined spam component.
A metric called edge betweenness has been suggested
as a tool to identify edges that go between communities
[5, 7, 9] The betweenness of an edge within a network
is a measure of how many of the shortest paths between
all the pairs of nodes in the network include that edge.
Since all paths linking the many nodes in the spam com-
munity to nodes in the non-spam community in a joined
component will include one of the very few edges that
correspond to the chance connections between the two
communities, these edges will clearly have a much higher
betweenness than the edges that connect members within
the same community. Therefore, in our approach, we
split joined components into two communities by remov-
ing the edges with the highest betweenness until there are
two distinct components, recalculating the betweenness
after each edge removal. This step is the same as the al-
gorithm given by Newman and Girvan[7]; however, we do
not execute this step on components with high clustering
coefficient (in fact, Newman and Girvan’s community-
finding algorithm tends to cut these email graphs into
many communities, whereas we are interested only in
finding the split between spammers and non-spammers).
When considering a data set from one author of all
the saved email messages over a period of 3 years, we
found only one example where an edge arose between a
spam and non-spam community. This edge was indeed
removed by the above separation technique. Therefore,
we expect that this separation technique will rarely be
needed, but we also expect that it is a robust method for
separating joined components, as long as spammers do
not have access to the user’s whitelist.
Data blacklist whitelist greylist total
spam 1 1,664 0 2,841 4,505
non-spam 1 0 331 282 613
spam 2 2,981 0 1,113 4,114
non-spam 2 0 68 229 297
TABLE II: Results of the algorithm on two datasets. Data
set 1 is from a 6 week period, set 2 is from a 5 week period.
The data sets are from two different users.
In Table II, we see the results of the algorithm on two
data sets covering 5 and 6 weeks for two different users.
Averaging over both sets, 44% of the nonspam is on the
whitelist, 54% of the spam is on the blacklist, and 47%
of the messages are on the greylist. In summary, about
half the time, the message is correctly identified, and
the other half, the algorithm cannot classify the message.
Over the test data, not one message is misclassified.
It is interesting to note that our algorithm may be
improved by adding more graph theoretic parameters to
our classification scheme. Figure 7 shows the CCDF of
the largest non-spam component. The degree distribu-
tion for the tail of this CCDF is pk ∝ k
−1.52. The nodes
with degrees 1 and 2 do not fit the power-law of the tail.
It is interesting to note that this approach of taking a
user’s view to make a subgraph of the entire email net-
work gives a degree distribution consistent with previous
works[1, 2], which were based on the email of multiple
users. These previous studies found degree distributions
following power laws with exponents from −1.3 to −1.8.
In our datasets, the spam components had power-laws
with exponents between −1.8 and −2.0. Thus, since
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FIG. 7: Degree CCDF for the largest non-spam component.
The line corresponds to pk ∝ k
−1.52. Note that nodes with
degrees 1 and 2 do not fit the power-law of the tail. We
believe this is due to the fact that the personal email network
construction can only add an edge when the user is a recipient
and does not see the edges that would exist between two users
when all users’ email traffic is considered.
spam components seem to have unusually high power law
exponents, it may be possible to use the degree distribu-
tion of a component to improve the distinguishing power,
or reduce the likelihood of error.
VI. HOW TO USE THE ALGORITHM?
As already discussed, our email-network-based spam
filtering algorithm automatically constructs whitelists
with 44% success rate, constructs blacklists with 54%
success rate with no false classifications, and leaves 47%
of the email unclassified. These hit rates are achieved
without any user intervention. Since the only informa-
tion necessary is available in the user’s email headers, the
algorithm can be easily implemented at various points in
the filtering process. Since whitelists and blacklists are
the foundation of many anti-spam approaches[12], our
technique, based purely on graph theoretic methods, can
be easily integrated with existing methods. For instance,
our algorithm may be used by mail administrators of
large email servers, such as corporate email servers, or
Internet service providers, since they can generate a per-
sonal email network for each of their users as the mail is
being delivered to their mail servers. The ability to gener-
ate whitelists and blacklists for all their users will greatly
improve the ability of central mail servers to reduce the
number of spam messages which reach end users.
Another major advantage of the algorithm is that it is
virtually immune to false negatives (e.g., non-spam be-
ing identified as spam), which suggests that our method
can also significantly increase the ease of use of content-
based anti-spam tools, which classify emails as spam
or non-spam based on the content of the email, rather
than the sender’s address. The best content-based fil-
ters achieve approximately 99.9% accuracy, but require
users to provide a training set of spam and non-spam
messages. These algorithms examine the content of the
sets of messages labeled as spam or non-spam to identify
common characteristics of the two types of mail, often us-
ing Bayesian inference[10]. The performance of content-
based algorithms is usually greatly improved if the train-
ing set comes from emails sent to the user who will run
the algorithm, which is to say, these algorithms work bet-
ter when tuned to specific email inboxes. Our method can
automatically generate an accurate training set, tailored
to the individual user’s inbox, so that the end user can be
less involved in the training process. This could dramat-
ically impact the ease of widely deploying content-based
anti-spam tools, which have been heretofore inconvenient
for end users to train effectively. Future research could
produce more sophisticated schemes to better combine
our method with content-based learning methods.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed an algorithm based on the proper-
ties of social networks to classify senders as spammers
or non-spammers. The algorithm has not misclassified
any senders in the email data sets we have tried. Using
this algorithm, it would be possible to generate training
sets for learning algorithms which may be content-based.
This is extremely important in achieving accurate, auto-
mated spam filtering.
There are many areas for further improvement of the
algorithm. Most obviously, more parameters of compo-
nents should be considered. In this paper, we classify
components based only on size and clustering coefficient,
but there are many more metrics which may provide
for statistical distinguishability between spam and non-
spam. An algorithm which incorporates more parameters
of the graph may be able to reduce the probability of mis-
classification even further. Unfortunately, significantly
decreasing the size of the greylist does not appear very
promising since the greylist components are very small in
size, and thus live in a small parameter space, and hence,
strong distinguishability between greylisted components
appears to be beyond the power of purely graph-based
techniques. As long as spammers continue to adapt their
strategies for defeating anti-spam tools, improving these
tools is a subject that will warrant further study.
In the long run, there is clearly a solution to the spam
problem: use cryptographic whitelists, where a user only
accepts messages that are cryptographically signed by
authenticated keys. The problem, of course, is that the
lack of infrastructure that is needed to make this scheme
accessible to the majority of end users makes the immedi-
ate potential for widespread use of such a scheme highly
questionable. Until this infrastructure is in place, end
users must rely on less perfect solutions, and will benefit
from any effort that makes these solutions more user-
friendly, and easier for mail servers and ISPs to broadly
distribute.
Moreover, even if the spam problem is solved, the email
network tool introduced here will become increasingly
useful. In particular, the personal email network has
8the potential to enable users to capture the community
structure in cyberspace. It is possible that better email
message management can be achieved if email clients are
aware of the various social groups of which the user is a
member, and our scheme for generating personal email
networks may give such information without any changes
to Internet email protocols.
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